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Tadeusz Sławek
“Sunny Flocks” and the “Hollow Pit”: 
Blake’s Book of Thel and a Question of Sexuality
The text has been chosen since not only does it document my long lasting interest 
and fascination with the work of  William Blake, but also because I believe that in the 
way in which it twists together the issue of human personhood constructed largely 
through the protocols of rationality on the one hand and desire which revokes the 
animal substance resistant to rational attempts to overwhelm it on the other, the 
essay can still find its place in contemporary debate in the field of humanities.
1.
The frame of the poem (and we cannot let go unnoticed the fact that it is also 
a frame, a set of covers for the “Book”) locates the text between a scene of the sun 
and that of a tomb. What begins on the meadows where women are tending “their 
sunny flocks”1 finishes not only in a general landscape of death (“A land of sorrows 
The daughters of Mne Seraphim led round their sunny flocks,
All but the youngest; she in paleness sought the secret air,
To fade away like morning beauty from her mortal day:
Down by the river of Adona her soft voice is heard,
And thus her gentle lamentation falls like morning dew:
She wander’d in the land of clouds thro’ valleys dark, list’ning
Dolours & lamentations; waiting oft beside a dewy grave
She stood in silence, list’ning to the voices of the ground,
Till to her own grave plot she came, & there she sat down,
And heard this voice of sorrow breathed from the hollow pit.
& of tears,” Pl. 4; 5) but in 
a particular place where 
death becomes MY own 
demise (“Till to her own 
grave plot she came,” Pl. 4; 
9). At the same time, this 
topography is marked by 
a  double estrangement 
— of a  person and of 
voice: in the spectacle of 
a morning Thel alienates 
herself from her sisters, does not lead the “sunny flocks” but laments in a detached 
place. To be more specific, the only thing we hear is “her soft voice”: the alienated 
1 William Blake, “The Book of Thel,” in: Geoffrey Keynes ed., William Blake: Complete Writ‑
ings (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 127—130. Further quotations will come from the same 
edition and will be marked as Pl. (plate number) and a line reference. Quotes from texts other than 
“Thel” will be marked as K plus a page reference.
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woman has left the company of other women and remains in an ambiguous rela‑
tionship with her body which disappears behind her voice.
At the other end of the narrative, Thel dissociates herself from humanity by 
her decision to explore the sphere of death and from her own voice which is now 
replaced by a call not hers but uttered from her own grave (“Till to her own grave 
plot she came, & there she sat down,/ And heard this voice of sorrow breathed from 
the hollow pit,” Pl. 4;9—10). What begins as a case of alienation of a human person 
from his/her kin and of his/her voice from the body ends as an ultimate estrange‑
ment from the living and a replacement of the human voice by mourning (“this 
voice of sorrow”) which — stemming from man’s final absence (“the hollow pit”) 
— remains in a dubious relationship to man.
A movement of the poem leads us then from morning to mourning, from the sun 
to a tomb.
2.
We cannot too quickly leave aside the question of voice. For at least two reasons: 
first, the voice of Thel decisively breaks a convention of the pastoral which links 
shepherds with singing. As the Music Master explains to Moliere’s M. Jourdain: 
“Singing has always been associated with shepherds.”2 Thel either indulges in “gen‑
tle lamentation” (Pl. 1; 5) or in the inarticulate vocal outbursts (“The Virgin started 
from her seat, & with a shriek/ Fled back […]” Pl. 4; 21); even if we could assume 
that the former still remains within the orbit of singing performance (Blake’s “gentle 
lamentation” seems to invite such a hypothesis through its similarity to the stand‑
ard rhetoric of pastoral madrigals which, for instance in Andrea Gabrieli’s work, 
talk about dolce duol, a “sweet lament”3), the latter certainly radically undermines 
such a possibility.
Second, the vocal pronouncement which concludes the poem, the utterance 
of the “hollow pit,” is not just a voice but “THIS voice [emphasis added]” where 
the pronoun highlights its object not merely in terms of deixis but also as a final 
destination, a thing towards which the whole process of expecting and reflecting 
is directed. THIS not only prepares us for the enunciation to come (where its func‑
tion resembles that of the “following”) but also announces the arrival of the long 
expected, the actualization of something which was anticipated (as in a phrase, “and 
finally came this man” uttered after a long period of intense waiting).
The ambiguities of  THIS “voice” prepare us for the dilemmas of narcissism: if 
one has to come to terms with the voice of the “hollow pit” before one understands 
2 See any edition of The Shopkeeper Turned Gentleman by Moliere.
3 Quoted in Howard Mayer Brown, “The Madrigalian and the Formulaic in Andrea Gabrieli’s 
‘Pastoral Madrigals,’ ” in: John Dixon Hunt, ed., The Pastoral Landscape (Washington: National 
Gallery of Art, 1992), 91.
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one’s being and identity, then the voice must necessarily come simultaneously from 
outside and inside of myself (is “my” grave truly, and if so then in what way, “mine”, 
and who is this “I” to whom this grave “belongs”?). Godard is right when he claims 
that Thel’s denial of life paves a way for Freud’s analyses (“This narcissistic denial 
of life provides a rich anticipation […] of Freud’s theories about the development 
of consciousness, conversion of libido, and formation of Anticathexes”4), but when 
unequivocally describing Thel as “the incurable adult narcissist [who is] unable to 
accept mortality through sexuality,”5 he does not see what we will be trying to dem‑
onstrate in this essay — that there is an inherent and inexorable narcissism which 
constitutes the very mechanism of desire and which cannot be totally overcome by 
the acting out of passions.
At the end of the soft voice of gentle lamentation there is always THIS voice of the 
hollow pit which goes beyond the clear identity marking strategies and in which I hear 
myself speak from the realm of death, in which “I” no longer can identify myself as an 
“I” (but neither can I categorically deny that there is no link between this voice and 
“me”) and, therefore, it will be better to say (purposefully and inevitably transcending 
the discipline of grammar) that in THIS voice “I” hear oneself speak (where “oneself ” 
refers to this non ‑identifiable speaker who/which only through its topography of 
death suggests itself as an “I”).
3.
The deictic pronoun announces a thing that only partly becomes available for 
me: I can hear it but its visibility is permanently sealed off. Thel does not see who 
is speaking from the hollow pit, and the phrase “THIS voice” doubly deludes our 
attention: first, because it indicates an object which manifests itself to us only in part, 
only through a synecdoche, second, because despite its deictic character the pro‑
noun can only indecisively suggest some object without naming it, can only make 
a gesture towards it without bringing it fully to our presence. THIS both points out 
the object and shows it to be unavailable for any specific naming; THIS replaces the 
name of the object which defies appellation.
THIS is where the inarticulate darkness emerges to the light of language without 
reaching the positivity of a substantive.
4.
We are facing the problem of loss: at the end, the deprivation is easily definable 
(death, splintering of the self which no longer controls what is and is not his/hers — 
4 Jerry Caris Godard, Mental Forms Creating: William Blake Anticipates Jung and Rank
(New York: University Press of America, 1985), 46.
5 Godard, Mental Forms Creating, 46.
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“This voice” speaks from Thel’s grave while she — still alive — listens to its pronounce‑
ments), at the beginning of the poem the loss is less specific. It does not convey the 
threat of death but yet its work is no less perturbing. One could detect in it a working 
of a paradoxical mechanism which enhances our concern with reality only to bring 
about the effect of disappointment and ultimate lack of interest in the external world. 
The drama of Thel is that of a melancholic as described by Freud in his 1917 essay on 
“Mourning and Melancholia” where melancholia is characterized as “a profoundly 
painful dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity 
to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self ‑regarding feelings […].”6
But, as we have said, in one of these characteristics Blake takes a different course 
from Freud: Thel’s melancholia seems to derive less from the “abrogation of interest 
in the outside world” and more from a sudden disruption of the temporal scheme 
which reveals the abysses of nothingness within the previously predetermined oper‑
ations of time. In such a process of unsettlement, time empties out and leaves noth‑
ing but void.
Before Thel comments upon the mortality of man, i.e. on the passage of time as 
the device of death, she is keenly aware of the passage of time as a process of becom‑
ing and production. Before time begins to signify death (“Why fade these children 
of the spring”), it intimates life (“O life of this our spring!”). What in the pastoral 
tradition appears as a critical moment in the sequence of time in which mourning 
is overcome (a new life of spring replacing the stagnancy and grief of winter, as in 
Blake’s juvenile poem dedicated to “Spring” in which we read about the season com‑
ing “upon our love ‑sick land that mourns for thee [spring],” K, l) now is presented 
as a point at which grief begins: love ‑sickness is not cured by spring but awakened 
by the sense of loss which inheres in the presence(s) of life. A grief announced by 
Thel concerns the premonition of loss which, as yet, remains unknown but which 
modifies the world and presents it as the doubly unfulfilled erotic: the loss is repre‑
sented as a purely disembodied vocal phenomenon which, additionally, is ascribed 
to “evening,” a time of waning and decline (“I lay me down […] and gentle hear the 
voice/ Of him that walketh in the garden in the evening time,” Pl. 1; 12,14).
A distortion of the erotic results from the unspecified loss which will have taken 
place in the future but which is being already enacted now in the phenomenal world.
5.
Let us again turn to Freud, who diagnoses the disturbing uncertainty at the heart 
of melancholia. Whereas mourning and grief always allow us to determine its cause, 
melancholia is the symptom of the loss which remains unnamed: “The unknown 
loss in melancholia would also result in an inner labour of the same kind [as grief] 
6 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in: Collected Papers: Authorized Translation 
under the Supervision of Joan Riviere, Vol. 4 (New York: Basic Books. 1959), 153.
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[…]. Only the inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we can‑
not see what it is that absorbs him so entirely.”7
Freud’s emphasis on the unavailability of the cause of melancholia must in the 
case of Thel be concerned with the literal understanding of that which cannot be 
seen and is anticipated as an alien time pocket developing within the temporal 
“now” (an “evening” envisioned in a “morning”) and as a mere voice (“of him that 
walketh in the garden in the evening” and “of sorrow”). But it is significant that, 
unlike Freud’s melancholic, Thel does not sever her links with the world, and the 
crisis of her relationship with reality is not so much due to the “abrogation of inter‑
est” as to the intense problematization of the connection between herself and the 
Other. Thel’s melancholy enacts a complicated drama in which, on the one hand, 
one recognizes the relentless necessity of the Other and, on the other hand, one is 
not certain whether the Other precedes the formation of one’s self or is a result of 
the self ’s solidification. A series of Thel’s philosophical interjections testifies to this 
uncertain location of melancholy between the grieving for the absence of the Other 
and the narcissistic confirmation of one’s exclusivity for which the Other is only 
needed as a reflecting mirror. In her questions Thel certainly struggles with mor‑
tality, but this is not merely a reflection of despair over the inevitability of dying; 
more importantly, it is an examining of time as an element in which one constantly 
“dies” in his/her relationships with the Other, in which man reaffirms his/her iden‑
tity through a nervous repetition of a personal pronoun which is answered by the 
indefiniteness (“no one”) of the absent partner (“I pass away: yet I complain, and 
no one hears my voice,” Pl. 3; 4) and which however leaves behind it nothing but 
emptiness (“I vanish […] and who shall find my place?” Pl. 2; 12). The senses “allure 
humanity to sexual pleasure, though that pleasure is also a part of the inevitable 
destruction of the body in its mortal day.”8
The placelessness of man who realizes that the relationship with the Other must 
be preceded by the recognition of one’s self as a realm of “death” (see Clod of Clay 
and her “My bosom of itself is cold, and of itself is dark,” Pl. 4; 12).
In the absence of the Other one has to “die” oneself in order to provide for the oth‑
erwise unidentifiable cause for sense of loss and thus a melancholy process of dejection 
is as much a self ‑reprobation as it is a self ‑mourning.
6.
There are three responses to Thel’s queries which reveal certain common fea‑
tures. All three of them are based on the principle of recognized weakness which 
is redeemed by the investing of energy into objects other than the speaking sub‑
7 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 155.
8 John Howard, Infernal Poetics: Poetic Structures in Blake’s Lambeth Prophecies (London: 
Associated University Presses, 1984), 52.
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ject. The Lilly of the valley is “very small” and “so weak, the gilded butterfly scarce 
perches” on it (Pl. 1; 16, 18) but it “nourishes the innocent lamb” (Pl. 2; 5); the Cloud 
“passes away,” but it bears “food to all our tender flowers” (Pl. 3; 10, 16); the Clod of 
Clay presents itself as “the meanest thing,” but she “bow[s] over the weeping infant” 
in a gesture of solicitude (Pl. 4; 11, 8). This economy in which weakness is a source 
of power makes it also clear that this empowerment does not come from the being 
itself but from a larger force; hence the Lilly is “visited from heaven” (Pl. 1; 18), the 
Cloud is overwhelmed by the “raptures holy” (Pl. 3; 11), and the Clod of Clay is 
exalted by “he, that loves the lowly” and who “pours his oil upon my head” (Pl. 5; 1).
The answers come then all not only from the perspective of the openness to the 
Other but, more dramatically, from the position of one who has been overcome and 
engulfed by the all powerful Other. If Thel enquires about the purpose of human life, 
then the three answers suggest that one’s existence is justifiable only on the ground 
of it being claimed by a force over which one has no control.
The Other is one who/which descends and who/which equips being with a purpose 
which is not being’s but which either belongs to the domain of public use (“bearing 
food to all our tender flower,” Pl. 3; 16) which also includes death (“Then if thou art 
the food of worms […] How great thy use […],” Pl. 3; 25), or eschatological plan of 
salvation (“thou shalt be clothed in light,” Pl. 1; 23).
7.
Thel’s resistance to this philosophy and her retreat to melancholia seem to stem 
from three sources. First, she refuses to see herself and her being as measured in the 
categories of “use;” at least, she cannot find for herself the equivalents of the “uses” 
all her interlocutors talk about. She can see the purpose of the Lilly but the ontol‑
ogy of her being cannot find access to this kind of purposiveness (having sketched 
the design of the pragmatic uses of the Lilly she exclaims: “But Thel is like a faint 
cloud […] I vanish from my pearly throne, and who shall find my place?,” Pl. 2; 12).
Second, she cannot find a middle path between the category of “use” and the 
temporal structure of being which seems to prempt any pragmatic discourse of 
“functions” and “applications.” In a characteristic answer to the Cloud’s exhorta‑
tion, Thel clearly lets know that her melancholy does not arise from questioning 
the very category of “use,” but, rather, from its incommensurability with man’s 
temporal character. Time puts “use” under erasure and what is at stake is a possi‑
bility of working out a philosophy which would reformulate this category, produce 
its meaning different from a mere scheme of pragmatic usages, natural causes and 
effects represented poetically in the Cloud’s rendition of the water circulation proc‑
ess (“The weeping virgin [“the fair eyed dew”] trembling kneels before the risen 
sun, / Till we arise link’d in a golden band […] bearing food to all our tender flow‑
ers,” Pl. 3; 13—15). Thel responds to this with “But Thel delights in these no more 
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because I fade away” (Pl. 3; 21), where the “no more” clearly allows us to see that 
the scheme of purposes and “uses” delineated by the Cloud is not alien to her but 
perceived as one which has exhausted its potential.
Third, the sense of some ontological menace and the resulting melancholy is 
amplified by the crisis of knowledge protocols which no longer seem to fulfil their 
contract on the strength of which they are to provide man with a network of proce‑
dures ordering the world and making it comprehensible. Thel, referred to as a “pen‑
sive queen” (Pl. 3; 29), is not satisfied with the answers because the submissiveness 
from which they stem implies the futility of knowledge which is replaced by the 
acceptance expressed best by the Clod’s statement “I know not, and I cannot know,/ 
I ponder, and I cannot ponder; yet I live and love” (Pl. 5; 5—6). The revelation of 
man’s temporality invalidating the elaborate scheme of natural and social “uses” 
prevents Thel from approving of this solution; in the situation of melancholia one 
can be saved neither by knowledge nor by ignorance (“Alas! I knew not this […],” 
Pl. 5; 8) as both responses are paralyzed by the inability to formulate a language, an 
articulate, rational discourse which would be in a position to deal with the purpo‑
siveness of being which transcending the structure of biological or human needs, 
causes and effects can only very imprecisely be addressed as “shining” (“Without 
a use this shining woman liv’d” Pl. 3; 22; “I […] leave my shining lot,” Pl. 5; 13).
Thel’s melancholia, which marks the disturbance in the sphere of relationships 
between her and the Other, is also a sign of a crisis of rationality which does not reject 
knowledge but looks for a new discourse which would be able to inscribe man again 
within a structure of meaningful relations with the Other and recognize independence 
of both sides from the social and biological immediate “uses.”
8.
The problem of “use” and “purpose” implicates Blake’s protagonist in a situation 
delineated by Kantian aesthetics. Having asked himself in the Third Movement of 
the “Analytic of the Beautiful” a question “What is a purpose?” Kant proceeds to link 
the notion of the purpose with that of a cause (“a purpose is the object of a concept 
insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause”9) and then, moving towards 
a judgment of taste, announces that aesthetic pleasure originates in a discovery, 
in the semiotic aspect of work, of the purposiveness without purpose which is the 
way in which an object offers itself to us (“[…] the liking […] can be nothing but 
the subjective purposiveness in the presentation of an object, without any purpose 
[…] and hence the mere form of purposiveness […] in the presentation by which 
an object is given us”10). Thel’s dilemma consists in her inability to find a formula 
 9 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1987), 64.
10 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 66.
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for the “mere purposiveness” which would go beyond the concepts and “uses” of 
the purpose as defined in cognitive judgments.
In fine, Thel’s melancholia derives from (an oddly Nietzschean touch in a Kan‑
tian interpretation) the impossibility of finding an aesthetic formula for human
life. A  viable suggestion if we remember about Blake’s insistence upon creative 
impulse as a formative power of man’s ethical structure (“A Poet, a Painter, a Musi‑
cian, an Architect: the Man or Woman who is not one of these is not a Christian,” 
K, 776).
9.
To use a pair of terms introduced by Kant in 16 paragraph of the same “Analytic,” 
we could also say that Thel on the one hand remains within the realm of “accessory 
beauty” (pulchritudo adhaerens) with its conviction that “the beauty of a human
Other etymologies suggested for the name of Thel hint 
at its close connection with the notion of “delay” or “hang 
in doubt” (from the Hebrew tela) or fragile transitoriness 
(the Hebrew Thel meaning “dew”) thus suggesting either 
her indecisiveness or the paralysing sense of mortality. 
A link between Thel and “dew” gets additional support 
from the early sections of the poem where the Lilly refers 
to her being “clothed in the morning manna” which may 
thus be an allusion implicating Thel as an “ornament,” 
a “dress” of nature, something that hides and covers while, 
ironically, simultaneously looking for the “naked truth.”
Mark Schorer enhances the centrality of the death motif 
by linking the name of Blake’s protagonist with a distorted 
reading of the subterraneous river Lethe which supports 
his interpretation of the poem as a neoplatonic drama of 
a reluctant birth (“Thel [is her name to suggest Lathe?] is 
an unborn spirit unwilling to enter life, yet she knows, as 
her first two questions indicate that if she is to learn the 
lesson of Experience, she must mix with its inhabitants”).
Howard, Infernal Poetics, 51;
Mark Schorer, William Blake: The Politics of Vision (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1959), 202.
being […] does presuppose 
the concept of the purpose 
[…] and hence a  concept 
of its perfection[…]”11); on 
the other hand, however, she 
tries in her constant probings 
to move towards “free beauty” 
(pulchritudo vaga) where “we 
presuppose no concept of any 
purpose.”12 The very impos‑
sibility of solving the prob‑
lem, of not being able to 
either remain in the sphere of 
purpose or radically move 
beyond it is coded in the pro‑
tagonist’s name; “Thel” may 
be derived from a Greek word 
signifying “will”13 which 
operates both on the level 
of a  self ‑assertive desire 
(“I desire something”) and an 
external scheme of targets (“I desire something”). As Kant recognizes it, such a posi‑
tioning of will sends it back to the domain of purpose: “The power of desire, inso‑
11 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 77.
12 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 77.
13 See Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant, Blake’s Poetry and Designs (New York: Norton, 
1979), 61.
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far as it can be determined to act only by concepts, i.e. in conformity with the pres‑
entation of a purpose, would be the will.”14
Thel operates within the irreducible difference between the aesthetic and the ethical: 
in the former she wants to abandon the concept of “purpose” and “use” (and remain 
in the sphere of “presentations”), in the latter she is constantly reminded about the 
impossibility of evading “purpose”; thus the dilemma shifts from the mere deciding 
between the two towards locating a chance for the mediation, a protocol of knowing 
and living which would enable man to accept the purpose for what it is — an opera‑
tion of will as modified by concepts (if Thel stands for “will,” her interlocutors present 
the varieties of reasonableness).
10.
Thel’s melancholia is a disease of purpose, or rather, a dis ‑ease of purpose, 
i.e. a position in which one feels ill at ease with one’s own life as oriented towards 
generally recognized purposes, a position where a purpose is perceived as alienated 
from myself (whereas the guides insist on the total internalization of their “pur‑
poses” which are actualized without mediation of knowledge and reflection, Thel 
repeatedly notices a fissure between herself and the “uses”). And where the notion 
of the purpose has been mentioned the social cannot be far away, whereas Thel’s 
“use” applied to the female life prompts the proximity of the sexual. It is to the gar‑
den scene that we have to turn to reconnoitre these two aspects and their common 
denominator — productivity.
Thel’s complaints clearly refer to the purpose from the perspective of some 
“useful” labour. Having delineated for herself the “uses” of the Lilly, she, in a stark 
contrast, projects the image of her own uselessness (or, Kant’s term, “unpurpo‑
siveness”): “But Thel is like a faint cloud kindled at the rising sun” (Pl. 2; 11). The 
conclusion of her barrenness is even more straightforward in the exchange with 
the Cloud: “But I feed not the little flowers […]I feed not the warbling birds […]” 
(Pl. 3; 19—20). A problematic relationship with work and its traditional system of 
connections in which family was closely affiliated with the division of labour and 
the structure of consumption (via the law of primogeniture, for instance, not an 
indifferent fact, perhaps, if one remembers that Thel is a daughter and “the young‑
est”  ‑ facts that alienate her from the structure of inheritance) cannot be a neutral 
factor in a poem which begins with a triple renunciation: of the unquestionable 
loyalty to the family (she separates herself from her kin), of work — which one has 
been allotted in the process of the division of labour (Thel refuses to “lead sunny 
flocks,” like her sisters) — and of the established ideal of the feminine behaviour 
(“paleness” defying models of beauty as well as a rebellious mien unbecoming of 
a young female):
14 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 65.
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The daughters of Mne Seraphim led round their sunny flocks,
All but the youngest: she in paleness sought the secret air,
To fade away like morning beauty from her mortal day […] (Pl. 1; 1—3)
The garden pastoral scenery evoked at the beginning of the poem, then systemati‑
cally assaulted by Thel’s rejection of internalizing of natural purposes as her own, 
and finally deconstructed by the graveyard imagery of the final episode, poses two 
fundamental problems: (1) of the social consequences of the model of the “unpro‑
ductive” existence in which the adjective “shining” (used by Thel to describe her 
life) refers not to the ontological quality of being (like in Heidegger’s analyses) but 
serves as a description of a mere polish of cultivation which lacks social “purpose”; 
(2) of the functioning of productivity on the level of human sexuality where it finds 
its extension in the ethics of nourishment and maternal care.
Thel, referred to in the poem five times as a “virgin” and three times as a “maid,” 
inhabits a space which even before the final slippage into the churchyard scenery
A mention of “Adona” is also linked with the rhythmic 
changes of seasons and, in this way, also related to the 
motifs of the pastoral aesthetics and ethics which Blake 
discusses in the poem. A succinct illustration of the motif 
is to be found in the First Book of Paradise Lost where, 
in a feat of poetic anthropology, Milton combines the 
story of amorous conquest (Astaroth) with that of death 
and decay, or to use Thel’s phrase, “fading away,” only to 
present Christianity as their overcoming:
“Her Temple on th’ offensive Mountain, built
By that uxorious King, whose heart though large,
Beguil’d by fair Idolatress, fell
To idols foul. Thammuz came next behind,
Whose annual wound in Lebanon allur’d
The Syrian Damsels to lament his fate
In amorous dityyes all a summer day,
While smooth Adonis from his native Rock
Ran purple to the Sea, suppos’d with blood
Of Thammuz yearly wounded: the Love‑tale
Infected Sion’s daughters with like heat,
Whose wanton passions in the sacred Porch
Ezekiel saw, when by the Vision led
His eye survey’d the dark Idolatress
Of ancient Judah.”
John Milton, “Paradise Lost,” Book 1, 2. 443—457, in: John Milton, 
Poetical Works, ed. Henry Charles Beeching (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1938).
is infected by death as an 
essential element of the amo‑
rous longing. The scene of 
lamentation takes place 
“Down by the river of Adonis” 
(Pl. 1; 4) which in two ways 
conjures the scene of death: 
first, it evokes the presence of 
Adonis and thus draws upon 
the incommensurability of 
love as divine energy and 
human mortality (Adonis was 
a mortal lover of Venus), sec‑
ond, by a  detour leading us 
through the first Book of Par‑
adise Lost, it summons the 
scene where women mourn 
a  dying god. A  correlation 
between the movement 
within the erotic (from Eros 
towards Thanatos) and a shift 
in the spatial design (from 
a  garden to a  graveyard) 
is a  central theme in the 
poem.
It translates the sexual from the discourse of aesthetic and social conventional 
eroticism of taste (the erotic as a social game as shown in Boucher and Restoration 
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Comedy) and measure (sexual relationship as an economic transaction) into the 
domain of the ethical question of the openness towards the other (desire as a force 
which refuses to be accommodated by the socially and aesthetically articulate dis‑
courses and reaches out towards the sphere of death and suffering).
11.
What happens in The Book of Thel is then a major transformation of the sex‑
ual which, from the level of an ego gratificatory strategic game, becomes open to 
a serious probing of the question of the Other. As we have said, a shift in the spa‑ 
tial arrangement is central in this respect as it allows us to trace Blake’s critique of 
a fashionable aesthetics of the picturesque culminating in the garden architecture 
theory of the day. One can claim that the picturesque of self is replaced by the 
sublimity of the other (one of Blake’s proverbs of hell maintains that “The most 
sublime act is to set another before you,” K, 151). A retreat from the picturesque is 
a withdrawal from what is merely visually pleasing towards what shatters, through 
the experience of displeasure, the conventional stability of vision. Cochin, in 1759, 
defines the picturesque as a careful balancing of elements which achieves the stand‑
ard of naturalness and its purposiveness of action which is, however, invisibly sub‑
tended by the artificiality of the artist’s intervention: “It is what is distributed so as 
to render natural attitudes in their most pleasing aspect without losing anything of 
the truthfulness of the action […].”15 Thel’s move towards the tomb explodes the 
pastoral picturesqueness of the “sunny flocks” and disrupts the correlation between 
the “most pleasing aspect” and the “truthfulness of action.”
Such a disruption inheres also in human sexuality which finds its ultimate repre‑
sentation in the final episode of the poem. Thel learns the lesson of the erotic from 
the sorrowful voice of the hollow pit having first listened to two stories of usefulness 
(Lilly’s and Cloud’s) and then having confronted the problem of maternity (Clod of 
Clay) which itself introduced a different tone into the presentation of the child. The 
infant appears as a worm (“Is this a Worm? I see thee lay helpless & naked,” Pl. 4; 
4) which has previously been shown as a part of the iconography of death (“did she 
only live to be at death the food of worms?” Pl. 3; 23). There is at least a triple sig‑
nificance in the image of the worm: first, it directly implicates sexuality in the scene 
of death thus problematizing again the question of productivity and “use”; second, it 
interrogates the expressivity and carefree joyfulness traditionally attached to sex in 
the 18th ‑century aristocratic culture. “Ah! weep not, little voice, thou canst not speak, 
but thou canst weep” (Pl. 4; 3) — the worm is speechless (thus casting doubt upon 
the tradition of pastoral erotic poetry and expressivity) and able to produce only 
15 In Mary Sheriff, Fragonard: Art and Eroticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), 83.
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an inarticulate discourse of mourning (hence displacing the unproblematic charac‑
ter of sexual fulfilment). Third, a worm could also insinuate sexuality in a different 
way: through its etymology relating it to both to a dragon and the seraphim (let us 
remember that Thel is a daughter of Mne Seraphim and thus a daughter of a pas‑
sion and a serpent, a child of the sexual impulse which must rediscover its power) 
it evokes the sacred (Christ is a serpent in the Orphic doctrine) and thus would give 
a theological sanction to the union of the sexes which, however, in keeping with 
Blake’s unorthodox views, would support the transgressive, alternative interpreta‑
tion of divinity as overtly sexualized (“Blake may have known of the Orphite gnostic 
cosmologies which identified the serpent with Christ. It is also conceivably relevant 
that a second traditional etymology of ‘seraph’ traces it to sa ra ph translated in the 
Authorized Version as ‘fiery flying serpent’ (e.g. Isaiah 14.29)”16).
The worm as a critique of expressivity and articulacy is also a renegotiation of 
the standard sexual symbols which in the tradition of 18th ‑century art frequently 
linked the controlled naturalness of the garden with the images of aggressive dom‑
ination. The initial scenery of Blake’s poem is that of Fragonard’s garden paintings. 
In a series of four panels in the Detroit Institute of Arts Fragonard compiles a clas‑
sic anthology of the horticultural motifs correlating the garden with sexuality. With‑
out aiming at a detailed analysis, let us only note five things of importance for 
our discussion of Blake.
Mary Sheriff provides us with a more detailed reading 
of sexual imagery in the Fragonard series whose “pasto‑
ralized seasons also imply an analogy between the natu‑
ral cycle and human sexuality.” Thus, we read about The 
Gardener that “In his extended right hand he holds the 
bird, a well established image of the male genitals […] the 
spout is positioned below the bird so as to point toward 
the young man’s pubic area, which is further emphasized 
by the knot at his waist. We can thus discern a triangular 
configu¬ration of three points — bird, spout, and knot — 
that converge on erogenous zone […] at a distance from 
the bird, the gardener holds a sign of the female, a basket 
filled with the flowers that identify the season. Although 
the configuration of the main symbols suggests that the 
actual coupling has not yet occurred, the other object 
lying at the gardener’s feet, the rake, may point towards 
the activities to come: ‘to rake’ (ratisser) was a euphemism 
for coition. Finally, the entwined trees bending over the 
figure also suggest the impending union.”
Mary Sheriff, Fragonard: Art and Eroticism (Chicago: Uni‑
versity of Chicago Press, 1990), 103, 109.
First, a  privileging of 
the activist male element of 
Spring (The Gardener) and 
Summer (The Harvester) 
which displace the conven‑
tional feminine embodiments 
of the two seasons.
Second, a removal of the 
feminine to the domain of 
Autumn (The Grape Gatherer) 
and Winter (The Wanderer) 
and its close affiliation with 
the female productivity (chil‑
dren) which emphasizes fer‑
tility but then, with the accent 
on the withering and decline 
of productive force, shifts 
most of formative energies of 
spring and summer unto the 
realm of the masculine.
16 Michael Ferber, “Blake’s Thel and the Bride of Christ,” Blake Studies 9 (no. l and 2 1980), 55.
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Third, whereas the Spring and Summer are the time of production (or insemi‑
nation), it is important to notice that this takes place due not so much to the opera‑
tion of natural powers but to the action of implements and tools (a scythe, a rake, 
a watering can) which differentiate the masculine reality from the female world of 
“matural” production (see the baby lying on the ground in the Autumn panel, as 
if to suggest its “growth” from soil). The male world is that of utensils and instru‑
ments, of mechanisms of control; the female space belongs to the sphere of “natural” 
enjoyment, and the word “labour” seems to slip in this context away from the toil 
and pain of child ‑bearing process (shown as a natural, easy, painless occurrence) 
to comfortably nest in the male world of scientific instrumentality.
Fourth, the 4th panel representing winter finalizes the movement of seasons as 
it shows the feminine as the itinerant force expunged from the domain of the set‑
tled and human (most fully hinted at in the Spring panel in the details of man ‑made 
garden architecture); the series of seasons ends with the expulsion from the realm 
of territorialized existence and labour (from Blake’s meadows of “sunny flocks”) 
which reflects the banishment of Adam and Eve from the paradise with a caveat 
that this time it is only Eve who is exiled from the garden domain of the male pro‑
ductivity. The scene of expulsion is in Fragonard a literal movement of expatriation, 
a removal from the father ‑land, a banishment from the father, a dislodgment from
Thus The Book of Thel can be read as a critique of con‑
ceptual knowledge which causes the paralysis of the life 
impulse and mispresents being as a one sided process in 
which man is a victim of destruction, and thus introduces 
a state of arrest in which man is unable to experience pleas‑
ure. Thel is unable to listen to the questions because her 
attention, motivated by the western knowledge formation 
protocols, expects answers perpetuating the already hold‑
ing solutions. Blake’s protagonist is left speechless (which 
is a situation she finds unbearable) in front of the knowl‑
edge which is [dodane] (un)founded upon the principle 
of “Gelassenheit” which does not require the elaborate 
reconstruction of causal links. In Angelus Silesius we read 
“Die Ros’ ist ohn’ Warum; sie bluhet, well sie bluhet, / 
Sie acht’t nicht ihr selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet,” 
and another great Silesian mystic Daniel Czepko adds in 
a poem explicitly called Ohn Ursache: “Die Sonne scheint. 
Warum? Sie schein, well sie muss scheinen, / Ihr Art zwingt 
sie dazu. So solt du Gott bloss meinen.”[bez odwołania? Ne 
mogę tego odnaleźć] See also a sudden intervention from 
Magritte’s notes: “I don’t know the reason (if there is one) 
for living or dying.”
Angelus Silesius, Le Pelerin Cherubinique (Paris; Presse Univer‑
siteires de France, 1964), Vol, 1, 136; Vol. 2, 61.;
Harry Torczyner, Magritte: The True Art of Painting (New York: 
Abradale Press, 1979), 76.
the regulated productivity and 
territorializing social roles.
Fifth, the frontal position 
of the woman suggests the 
act of offering which, in turn, 
implies that the eviction from 
the male world will cease and 
the paternal paradise will be 
retrieved on condition of the 
seductive offering carried 
out from the position of total 
subservience (the woman is 
shown as an itinerant, pictur‑
esque beggar).
Thel’s refusal to comply 
with the role imposed upon 
her by the parental author‑
ity leads eventually to the 
collapse of the garden scen‑
ery and its replacement by 
the “hollow pit,” but such 
a movement also implies an 
activation of the energies of 
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the “Contraries” which disrupt the conventional parcelling and territorializing of 
gender roles and its accompanying modes of fertility (hence, for instance Thel’s 
refusal to tend the “sunny flocks” and her problematic attitude towards mater‑
nity). A replacement of the garden by the “valleys dark” is also an act of a sympa‑
thetic understanding for the social transformation which cannot be incidental if 
we remember that the date of The Book of Thel coincides with the outbreak of the 
French Revolution. A movement not absent from the late Fragonard of his Fete at 
Saint ‑Cloud (1774) where a nature of the picturesque gives way to a world of darker 
premonitions and turbulent powers of the uncontrollable outburst of natural (and 
social) forces. “The props in his painting appear in paintings by others […]. But 
Fragonard was a visually intelligent man with urgent emotions. In this painting, he 
takes a traditional motif, the fete, and invests it with a new meaning to correspond 
to his intimations of a waning cohesion. The fallen trees were cultivated by man 
who hoped to dominate nature through artifice. We do not know, in Fragonard’s 
painting, whether man or nature overturned these comely trees. We can only feel 
the melancholy that these supine living objects induce.”17
The melancholy of Thel and the dejection noticeable in the shift of the scenery 
from the picturesque garden to the terrifying “hollow pit” speak not only of the 
crumbling of ontological grounding of man and its supplementary aesthetic force 
of the horticulturalist ordering of nature by artifice but also of the abysmal origin of 
a new order which in his voice of sadness was announcing the epoch of the politi‑
cal revolutionary terror (“Fragonard painted this embellishment for a rich man’s 
house at a time when the social order was being questioned on every side […] The 
world of forms was being expanded despite the new regime’s effort to control it ever 
more strictly”18). From this perspective, the act of abandoning her herds acquires 
a significance which is transgressive both politically and religiously: the “flocks” are 
let loose, liberated from the authority of the shepherd, and the adjective “sunny” 
qualifying the flocks may refer to the features of Christ thus opening a possibility 
of commenting upon Thel’s quest as a critique of Christian orthodoxy maintained 
by the Lilly, Cloud, and Clod: “Thel the shepherdess has left her charge by the sec‑
ond line of the poem and so she has risked eternal life in the love of Christ in order 
to question her role […] The three creatures she talks to all tell the same tale […] 
that by selfless love one will attain an intimate union, a marriage, with the sunlike 
Christ.”19 The denial of “sunny flocks” can then be looked upon as (1) a refutation of 
the concept of the imposed duty (even if the duty in question has to do with exer‑
cise of care and tenderness), and (2) as a denial of Christ as an intimate, though 
mystical, partner; a disavowal of the physical body turns out to be a rejection of the 
spiritual Body. The first perspective is liberating as it allows Thel to ask questions, 
17 Dore Ashton, Fragonard in the Universe of Painting (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Insti‑
tution Press, 1988), 173.
18 Ashton, Fragonard in the Universe of Painting, 173.
19 Ferber, “Blake’s Thel and the Bride of Christ,” 48.
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i.e. to investigate the possibility of acquiring her own knowledge (“It is precisely 
Thel’s insistence on asking questions and striving for knowledge which identifies 
her as the only fully human character in the poem”20).
The other outlook shows that her attempt at forming a new type of cognizance 
shuts out, prematurely, sexuality and thus, from the very beginning reduces the 
chances of the whole operation and opens a wide thoroughfare along which repres‑
sion moves from the sexual to other areas of being (“To Blake and Yeats sexual 
repression is at the root of political aggression and revolution […] They cannot 
achieve the vision of Eternity until she becomes disintegrated and re ‑integrated in 
the process of experience, having accepted the vision of the Marriage. Wisdom is 
not found above the clouds but in the suffering of the pit”21).
The voice from the “hollow pit” is a pronouncement of the uncontrollable force 
which disturbs the system of sensual perception and ordering of social exchange by 
uncovering a mechanism of difference in what previously was constituted as a, sup‑
posedly, one homogeneous body (social and individual).
12.
A series of questions articulated by the “voice of sorrow” precedes two impor‑
tant events in the text. First, it predates Thel’s response to them which looks like
“Why cannot the Ear be closed to its own destruction?
“Or the glist’ning Eye to the poison of a smile?
“Why are Eyelids stor’d with arrows ready drawn,
“Where a thousand fighting men in ambush lie?
“Or an Eye of gifts & graces show’ring fruits & coined gold?
“Why a Tongue impress’d with honey from every wind?
“Why an Ear, a whirpool fierce to draw creations in?
“Why a Nostril wide inhaling terror, trembling, & affright?
“Why a tender curb upon the youthful burning boy?
“Why a little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire?”
The Virgin started from her seat, & with a shriek
Fled back unhinder’d till she came into the vales of Har.
an escapist gesture (“The 
Virgin […] with a  shriek/ 
Fled back […] into the vales 
of Har,” Pl. 6; 21—22). Sec‑
ond, it antecedes the 
vignette which frames the 
text and which is overtly 
sexual in its phallic imagery 
of a  woman straddling 
a  writhing body of a  ser‑
pent). It seems that consid‑
ering the presence of the 
engraving (which, if we 
realize its position between the body of the text and the ultimate closing of 
“The End,”22 can function as a summary of the argument) sexuality gains priority 
20 William J.T. Mitchell, Blake’s Composite Art: A Study of the Illuminated Poetry (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), 88.
21 Rachel V. Billigheimer, Wheels of Eternity: A Comparative Study of William Blake and W.B. 
Yeats (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), 23—24.
22 In the original version of the essay, the text is here accompanied by the illustration found at 
the end of Blake’s poem. Electronic versions of the illuminated copies of this and other works are 
available at The William Blake Archive: http://www.blakearchive.org/blake/. Editors’ note.
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in the debate, and hence the last two questions acquire a particular importance (one 
cannot pass indifferently the fact that some copies do not have these lines which 
must have been deleted by Blake himself on request of a prospective buyer for whom 
they must have appeared to be too controversial): “Why a tender curb upon the 
youthful burning boy? / Why a little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire?” (Pl. 
6; 19—20). These inquiries appear at the end of the interrogation which, without 
providing any answers, seems to present human existence as profoundly opened 
and vulnerable to destruction. In fact, the very rhetorical form of this philosophy 
of vulnerability constitutes one of its ideological cornerstones: where there is no 
answer, there can be no solidity of foundations, no affirmative or negative state‑
ments which could be used as general indicators or signposts to follow by the indi‑
vidual. The question both enfeebles and strengthens the social sphere; the enfeeble‑
ment comes from the subversive role the question plays vis à vis social conventions 
and routines which always assume the form of answers (like in a book of catechism), 
the strengthening derives from the rejuvenation of the social energy produced by 
the individual effort to slough off the superficial aspects of sociability.
The question problematizes the social ordering of the answer and, in turn, pre‑
pares the ground for a new social contract which would not be founded upon a mere 
restrictive operations of Blake’s “One Law,” the situation clearly depicted by Blake in 
his “Marriage of Heaven and Hell” cantered on the doctrine of moral/bodily “impulse” 
rather than premeditated “rules” (K, 158) (this is strikingly evident in Nietzsche’s 
verdict of the Death of God followed, in the 125th aphorism of The Gay Science, by 
a list of questions as new non ‑affirmative non ‑indicators given to humanity, and in 
Blake’s famous poem “The Tyger,” where the identity of God is allowed to be probed 
only in the rhetorical mask of the question).
13.
There are two things that need to be said about the voice’s sorrowful interroga‑
tion, First, that the destructiveness to which being is vulnerable through its sensual 
structure is, at least in part, balanced by pleasurability of impressions (“Eye of gifts 
& graces,” “Tongue impress’d with honey”) and also by the fact that the senses not 
only are mere channels through which being is available for “destruction” but also 
means of destroying (“An Ear a Whirlpool fierce to draw creations in”). The essence 
of our vulnerability is this: we perform destructive operations while being, at the 
same time, ourselves destroyed. This certainly refers also to the sphere of the sexual 
which either brings about the crisis provoked by a contrast between eroticism and 
mortality, or — when repressed through, for instance, family politics — a predica‑
ment of repression. In the former case, one is opened unto the other but must (which 
Thel cannot do) remain affirmative about death and suffering (i.e. according to later 
Freud in his Problems of Anxiety, about a possibility of castration, a fear by no means 
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limited to the male sex); the latter condition involves a  process in which 
An interplay of the ethics of beauty, of the pastoral, and 
pleasure based on closure and that of sublimity of suffering 
and death founded upon opening; a move from the “sunny 
flocks” to the “hollow pit” followed by a return which sug‑
gests that the latter is always present in the former. Not 
only Bataille in his doctrine of the black sun but also Rene 
Magritte knew this truth. His 1938 painting The Beyond 
shows the sun suspended in the anonymous and uniden‑
tifiable sky above the tomb which fills the foreground: 
a landscape which synthesizes that of Blake’s Book of Thel 
with its movement from the “river of Adona” to the “val‑
leys dark.” Yet another aspect of Blake’s thought — death 
is a part of sexual experience, there is no sun which would 
not shine upon a tombstone. Magritte: “In answer to the 
sun, I have come up with: a tomb [..] the problem of the 
sun. It was death, indeed, so that it is not possible for fruit‑
less doubts to arise.” Additional argument behind Blake’s 
critique of doubt if the poet launches a bitter attack against 
Bacon and Newton as prophets of doubt, it is also for 
this reason — they represented the binary thought of 
oppositions which did not allow for the discovery of 
death (of anus, of vagina) in the sun but kept the two 
strictly apart as the deist theology turned God into a deus
absconditus.
Torczyner, Magritte: Ideas and Images, 122.
 the “repressed libido produces a  deflection from the sexual aim so that love
is experienced as depletion 
and the re ‑enrichment of the 
ego can be affected only by 
a withdrawal of libido from 
its objects.”23 The sublimity of 
sexual ethics implies a neces‑
sary confrontation with suf‑
fering and loss which, how‑
ever, does not lead to the 
narcissistic turning towards 
one’s own self but to the 
affirmative acceptance of eva‑
nescence. Thel relies on two 
different solutions: first, she 
(in her complaints) rejects the 
very idea of mortality and the 
possibility of loss; second, she 
grasps the sense of death 
impulse in the language of the 
senses but returns to the pre‑
vious situation, this time, 
however, aware of the con‑
frontation with terror. She 
returns to the ethics of clo‑
sure which has already been punctured by the inarticulacy of her response 
(“a shriek”). Thel is presented in the border situation in which narcissism evolves 
towards the opening through which the object of desire is shown either as the other 
(with the inevitable element of loss and death) or, as we shall see, as the self ‑critical 
work of desire upon itself (“Thel is at the very point of embracing mortality through 
sexuality, poised on the brink of transferring libido from self to object”24).
Thel’s escape at the end of the poem is an attempt to evade the violence constitutive 
of being; in aesthetic terms — to circumvent the ethics of sublimity (of “whirlpool,” 
“terror” met with “trembling and affright”) in which suffering plays an essential role 
by turning towards the pastoral ethics of the picturesque (suggested in the opening 
section by the shepherd, pastor ‑like, occupations of “leading sunny flocks”) which, 
however, now contains a possibility of the other either as a physical other or its equiva‑
lent enclosed in the very structure (see point 15).
23 Diana Hume George, Blake and Freud (London: Cornell University Press, 1980), 95.
24 George, Blake and Freud, 95.
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14.
The second observation refers to the opening pronoun (out of ten lines spoken 
by the voice “from the hollow pit” seven begin with “why”). Questions posed in
Marginally, let us note the importance of inarticulacy, 
and thus of a muted, distorted speech in alternative 
discourses of rebellion (rock’n’roll) and art. It is signifi‑
cant that “inspired by Freud’s analyses Dali frequently 
portrayed himself without a mouth (The Great Masturba‑
tor, 1929; The Persistence of Memory, 1931); this symbolised 
his own impotence by equating his mouth with the closed 
female genitals. In Luis Bunuel’s and Salvador Dali’s 1928 
film Un Chien andolou, a woman’s auxiliary hair grows in 
place of man’s disappearing mouth […] Hans Bellmer […] 
often shows the congruency between the orifices of eye, 
ear, and mouth and vagina and anus.”
One must also remember Margitte’s famous 1934 painting 
called The Rape, which literally equates the mouth with 
the vagina.
Uwe Schneede, Rene Magritte: Life and Work, trans. Walter Jaffe 
(London: Barron’s, 1978), 68.
this manner want to establish 
a  certain order in which 
answers arrange themselves 
in a view of the world regu‑
lated by the relationship of 
cause and effect (“why?/ 
because”). The sense and 
“use” of being is measured in 
terms of causation and its 
rationality. But if this is the 
case, then Thel’s panic and 
“shriek” is a sign of the frus‑
tration effectuated by a series 
of questions which invalidate 
themselves by not proposing, 
nor leaving any room for, an 
answer.
In Kantian terms, she rejects the possibility of non ‑conceptual grasping of 
being as belonging to the sphere of pulchritudo vaga and sees it rather in terms 
of the accessory beauty of pulchritudo adhearens for which one must necessarily 
have the notion of the “concept” and “purpose” (“Free beauty does not presup‑
pose a concept of what the object is meant to be. Accessory beauty does presup‑
pose such a concept […] and as such is attributed to objects that fall under the 
concept of a particular purpose”25). Her failure to understand being in terms of 
“free beauty” is signalled earlier in a conversation with the Lilly who does not 
specify the purpose of its existence otherwise than in the categories of the antici‑
pated splendour and shining of being (“Thou shalt be clothed in light,” Pl. 1; 22) 
and is corrected by Thel who provides for the Lilly a list of most immediate pur‑
poses (“Thy breath doth nourish a little lamb,” “Thy wine doth purify the golden 
honey,” Pl. 2; 5, 8).
That the voice of the “hollow pit” is answered only by a “shriek” can be, in fact, 
taken as a promising sign, i.e. a response which through its inarticulacy recognizes 
the power of the non ‑rational and thus allows for Thel’s return to the ethics of the 
pastoral to be a return with a difference: it is not a withdrawal to the same list of 
problems, not a relapse into melancholia, but a retrieval of a previous mode of 
being on a different level upon which the inarticulate will now counter the repres‑
25 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 76.
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sive forces of the purpose ‑oriented discourse. It is this process of returning to the 
same with a difference which makes it possible to look at Thel’s evolution as a case 
of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence: Thel has problems with imagining life according 
to the edifying messages of her instructors (which try to impose upon her a sense 
of general purpose and destination consummated in and by the act of final redemp‑
tion) and instead is willing to repeat a horrifying experience of questioning (“The 
most intense effort of will that Nietzsche himself usually called for […] was not the 
will to live alone or publish unpopular books, but to imagine eternal recurrence and 
love the truth of his fate […]”26).
That Thel’s exclamatory shriek is a sign of a major breakthrough can also be 
argued on another ground: it announces an opening of her being so far sealed off 
either in the discourse of inquiry or in silence. It is not incidental that in the last 
episode Thel remains a speechless wanderer (“She stood in silence,” Pl. 6; 8); the 
paralysis of speech is a continuation and a result of the failure of her previous 
interrogations. Thus, an outburst, “a shriek,” is an unsealing of mouth in a new 
discourse which belongs neither to articulacy of logic nor to the chaos of silence; 
if the disappearance or gluing of mouth stands for impotence, then Thel’s shriek 
could be a violent parting of lips, an opening of mouth (but also of a vagina) which 
gives birth to a form which inscribes her within the domain of fertility but, at the 
same time, shows that its product is monstrous, deformed, “untrue” (if measured 
by the standards of the articulacy of discourse or conventional, “pastoral” schemes 
of human beauty). “A shriek” is an act of gargantuan and outrageous birth; a shriek 
is a monster of Thel’s previous discourses in the same way as a monster is a dis‑
tortion of Frankenstein’s genuine, though unrestrained, pursuit of knowledge. 
Without subscribing to the overtly militant feminist reading of The Book of Thel 
produced by Helen Bruder one ought, however, to endorse her claim that “the 
final shriek is one violent denunciation and Thel flees back to Har to reanimate 
her dissenting ‘sighs’ and ‘moans’ which the patriarchally saturated Clod had 
momentarily called down.”27 A rebellion against patriarchy (and its victory sug‑
gested by the engraving) is due to the awareness of stimuli, the arousal and excite‑
ment which refuses to be contained by the articulate discourse. Recognizing desire 
(for which Thel needs death and suffering) and thus overcoming the melancholia 
(a “shriek” as opposed to “sighs” and “moans”), Blake’s protagonist locates herself 
in what Nietzsche calls the “aesthetic state” and her trip through “the lands of 
clouds” (Pl. 6; 6) is also a journey to the origin of language at the spring of pas‑
sion, suffering, and body (“This is where languages originate: the languages of 
tone as well as the languages of gestures and glances […] even today one still hears 
with one’s muscles, one even reads with one’s muscles”; “Compared with music 
26 Harvey Birenbaum, Between Blake and Nietzsche: The Reality of Culture (Lewisburg: Buck‑
nell University Press, 1992), 101.
27 Helen Bruder, “The Sins of the Fathers,” in: Historicizing Blake, Steve Clark and David Wor‑
rall, eds., (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 156.
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all communication by words is shameless; words dilute and brutalize; words 
depersonalize; words make the uncommon common”28).
Nobody analysed this ambiguity of the body better than 
Rene Magritte. The problem is complicated but, for our 
purposes, it suffices to look at it from the perspective of 
the body which denies its own stability and fixedness: 
a metamorphosing body of Magritte. Putting aside the 
cases of metamorphosing objects (like a rock transform‑
ing into an eagle in The Domain of Arnheim, 1962), let us 
comment briefly only on the work in which it is the human 
body that forms the centre of the metamorphic process. 
In 1934 Magritte paints his Homage to Mack Sennet with its 
motif of the sleeping gown which takes over the feature of 
the female nakedness, the motif made famous 13 years later 
by another of his paintings Philosophy of Boudoir upon 
which it is amplified by an image of female feet caught 
in the moment of transmogrification into a pair of shoes. 
A mystery of the body is outlined in the work in at least 
three ways: first, by its placement in a wardrobe which 
suggests closure and darkness, second, by its immobiliza‑
tion on a coat hanger which locks it in a somewhat uneasy 
relationship with the notion of the body as an animated 
matter, third, by the ambiguity of the direction and stage of 
the process of transformation — we do not know whether 
it is the body that is metamorphosing (or has metamor‑
phosed) in a night gown or vice versa. Besides, the very 
interior of a dark wardrobe, symbolic of the womb, 
remains in a synecdotal relationship with the body bring‑
ing us in the immediate vicinity of the process of a mon‑
strous birth: a body produces (and we learn about it only 
due the brutal opening of a door, the opening which, most 
probably with a squeak, with “a shriek,” forms an orifice 
letting our gaze in) a being, a body, another body, which 
covers its nakedness by its nakedness, and — paradoxically 
— reveals the nakedness by the concealment “The cover‑
ing up of sexual features is thus revealed as a technique of 
exposure.” The body cannot be naked, there is no way of 
getting round the difference which separates desire and its 
“bed” from “a little curtain of flesh.
Schneede, Rene Magritte, 70.
The “shriek” does not 
eliminate speech but certainty 
punctures it and perforates its 
smooth surface uncovering 
the domain of purposiveness 
subversive towards articulate 
concepts of language. Thel 
embodies human inability to 
confront existence as princi‑
pally non ‑causative in char‑
acter; her return to the prac‑
tices of the pastoral is a sign of 
the difficulty of conceiving of 
being as not explainable in the 
categories of “because.”
A  sense of touch, omit‑
ted from the main list of 
interrogations, returns (as 
the repressed always does in 
Freud’s theory) in the final 
questions which we have 
already approached in sec‑
tion 10 and which directly 
precede Thel’s escape. What 
is at stake in these two lines is 
a confrontation with sexual‑
ity (Harold Bloom notes with 
regard to the final list of ques‑
tions that “the vocabulary of 
this lament is drawn from 
Elizabethan conventions of 
erotic poetry,”29) a  compli‑
cated engagement with, as we 
already know, most impor‑
tant consequences (a  failure 
of the ethics of the sublime accompanied by a partial withdrawal towards the eth‑
ics of the pastoral). Philosophically, sexuality is presented as profoundly entrenched 
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and Reginald John Hol‑
lingdale (New York: Random House 1967), #809, #810.
29 Harold Bloom, Blake’s Apocalypse: A Study in Poetic Argument (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 61.
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in violence (the adjective “tender” does not invalidate the disciplinary character 
of the “curb” but points at the sublimation of the regimens of restraints) and in 
the regressive operations of desire which stimulates and, at the same time, evades 
and defies the body’s efforts directed at fulfilment. Restrictive activities are not of 
a merely conventional type; rather, the problem goes deeper and presents them 
(“tender curb”) as a necessary element of the sexual which, despite being the most 
radical opening unto the other, is presented as already penetrated by the violent 
character of being. That the “curb” is “tender” emphasizes a desperate amorous 
effort of masking the violence by the involved parties who, attempting satisfaction, 
cover up the nakedness of vehemence with the intricate play of the bodies already, 
despite their efforts, implicated in the very violence of being. “The bed of desire” is 
concealed behind “a little curtain of flesh.”
Desire is, for Blake, a key mechanism of man’s ontological structure, but this is 
precisely why it is so dramatically misunderstood. Its operations are considered to 
lead to the utmost fulfilment and therefore desire has, over centuries, acquired 
a characteristic script which allows for its unequivocal readability (from the senti‑
mental signals of tears and blushing to the pornographic ostentation of erection), 
whereas, for Blake, desire uses these semiotic instruments not to reveal but, just the 
opposite, to conceal itself. The drama of man’s desire is of a radical character: we 
know it to be the guarantor of sanity and health on condition of prompt and unhin‑
dered operation (in Proverbs of Hell we read: “He who desires but acts not, breeds 
pestilence”), we know that it is the ultimate point of openness unto the other (“My 
bosom of itself is cold”), and yet it is also the realm where we realize that our body 
(supposedly a most perfect instrument of desire) must fail in its attempts to answer 
the call of desire. This failure is not trivially due to the limitations of physical 
strength and stamina (voiced so well by Shakespeare in Troilus and Cressida); the 
delinquency is of a much more fundamental type and is linked directly to the char‑
acter of desire which uses its physiological machinery (the body) to secure its own 
enigma: the body acts out desire but does not reveal it, does not show what its 
essence and truth is. The mystery of desire is that it belongs to the body and, at the 
same time, goes beyond it: the body is a passionate machine, but it also masks desire 
and thus veils both itself and desire. George suggests that the “little curtain of flesh” 
is the hymen, “the final and decisive boundary for Thel,”30 a point supported from 
yet another perspective by Godard who, invoking another of Blake’s female char‑
acters, claims that “Rank might well appreciate the torn hymen as a symbol of the 
terror of separation following Birth Trauma, an emblem of Experience best worn 
in the manner of Oothoon — first naively, then with boldness.”31 If we read the 
“bed” in Blake’s “bed of our desire” as an ultimate grounding, a final point beyond 
which one cannot go, a stratum which is impenetrable and thus in its mystery can 
30 George, Blake and Freud, 97
31 Godard, Mental Forms Creating, 126.
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serve as a foundation (in the same way as we do when we speak about a “river bed” 
or a “bedrock”), then we would be able to see that desire must remain an ever secre‑
tive layer of being, a foundation which cannot be revealed but whose operations we 
enact every minute through and in the activities of our body.
Virginity of Thel which is a mark of closure and the “fail‑
ure to embrace experience” and therefore of distortion of 
the ethical potential (“Deform’d I see these lineaments of 
ungratified desire,” K, 298; “Abstinence sows sand all over/ 
The ruddy limbs and flaming hair,/ But Desire Gratified/ 
Plants fruits of life & beauty there,” K, 178) of the openness 
unto the other. But it certainly reinforces Blake’s attack 
upon the establishment and restrictiveness of political 
and intellectual strategies of confinement (“the mind‑
forg’d manacles” of London, K, 216; “When Satan first the 
black bow bent/ And the Moral Law from the Gospel rent,/ 
He forg’d the law into a Sword […],” K, 683). Virginity, 
for Blake, is the same vehicle of political manipulation as 
celibacy in Hume’s analysis of the policies of Rome: “The 
Roman pontiff, who was making every day great advances 
towards an absolute sovereignty over the ecclesiastics, per‑
ceived, that the celibacy of the clergy alone could break off 
entirely their connection with the civil power, and depriv‑
ing them of every of every other object of ambition, engage 
them to promote […] the grandeur of their own order […] 
Celibacy, therefore, began to be extolled, as the indispen‑
sible duty of priests.”
David Hume, History of England, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics, 1983), 91.
Thel escapes from the 
truth of sexuality which 
points, first, at its violent 
character moderated by sub‑
limatory mechanisms of the 
amorous behaviour (which 
is by no means reducible to 
a  mere conventionality but 
which results from our most 
intimate and radical effort to 
practice the sublime ethics of 
opening unto the other), and, 
second, at the abysmal nature 
of sexuality which draws us to 
the bottom (“bed,” “whirlpool 
fierce”) of being (the moment 
of the sublime ethics of open‑
ness) only to push us back to 
the surface of the self while 
both actions are made possi‑
ble through the operations of 
the body (one can reflect on 
how this situation resembles 
Foucault’s description of the development of modem sexuality towards two proc‑
esses: “[…] we demand that sex speaks the truth […] and we demand that it tells us 
our truth”32; Blake’s correction of Foucault’s statement would be that indeed desire 
evokes truth, but its “untruth” is a part of the fundamental truth of desire). Desire 
activates the body and distances itself from it; a renunciation of the body, blindness 
to its energies and a total subjection to the elaborate protocols of its erotic prac‑
tices produce the same result — an inarticulate cry, a moan, or a sigh (“a shriek”) 
in which, in an unknown discourse defying the rationality and abstractions of Car‑
tesianism, we express both the fascination and disappointment with desire which 
does not merely reveal the truth but masks it while revealing (“Sexuality, the lust to 
rule, pleasure in appearance and deception, great and joyful gratitude for life and its 
typical states […]”; see also Nietzsche’s criticism of virginity charged with Thel ‑like 
32 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1978), 69.
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existential “anemia”: “priestly = virginal = ignorant, physiological characteristics of 
idealists of this sort ‑: the anemic ideal”33).
Again the inarticulate sound is what must bother us here; through this collapse 
of the ordered discourse (partly already suggested by the insistence on the question 
as a main rhetorical strategy of the poem which at the end assumes a form of ques‑
tions bereft of answers as if it were a parody of catechism) we try to stop, at least for 
a moment, to name, to relate, to form concatenations of causes and effects, in fine 
— to regulate the world. In an act of violence to language (inarticulacy perforates 
a smooth skin of discourse), we violently restrain the right of speech to do violence 
to things (Foucault: “[…] discourse does not passively reflect a pre ‑existent reality 
but is a violence which we do to things”34).
Thel escapes (“with a shriek”) because she cannot face a revelation of the unfound‑
edness of being: in the same way as the ground opens underneath her feet (the voice 
speaks from “the hollow pit”), the structure of her existence and ontological modality 
is shown as retying on the foundation (“bed of desire”) which must for ever remain 
covered by the very mechanism and operations (“a little curtain of flesh”) which it 
has produced in order to signal and enact its presence. Nakedness conceals, but in this 
concealment it speaks of a nakedness beyond the nakedness of the body which only 
a body can painfully relate to.
The body is both a true and false key to desire.35
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